Theabovediscussionshouldnot,however,beinterpretedtomeanthatunderprivateownershipofresourcesthemarginalproductivitiesofhomogeneouslabormustbeequaleverywhereatalltimes.Thecostsofinformationandofmigration,anddifferentialsinnonpecuniarygainsandinthecostsoflivingassociatedwithdifferentjobs,aresufficienttoproduceunequalmarginalproductsoflabor.Thesefactors,ofcourse,canbeincorporatedintothegeneralbodyofeconomictheory.Iobjecttothehypothesesofdisguisedunemploymentandthedualeconomyonthegrounds,rather,oftheirneglectoftheflexibilityoflanduseandofthepertinentpropertyrightconstraints.
[1].Theliteraturesharingtheseviewsisenormous.ButseeW.A.Lewis,"EconomicDevelopmentwithUnlimitedSuppliesofLabor."ManchesterSchoolofEconomicandSocialStudies(May,1954).Forgeneraldiscussionofthesehypotheses,seeBenjaminHiggins,EconomicDevelopment(NewYork:W.W.Norton＆Company,1959),chaps.11-17;C.H.C.Kaoetal,"DisguisedUnemploymentinAgriculture,"inAgricultureinEconomicDevelopment,ed.C.K.EicherandL.Witt(NewYork:McGraw-HillBookCo.,1964);H.Myint,TheEconomicsoftheUnderdevelopedCountries(London:Hutchinson＆Co.,1964);andA.K.Sen,"PeasantsandDualismwithorwithoutSurplusLabor,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy(October,1966).
[2].Tsung-hanShen,AgriculturalDevelopmentonTaiwansinceWorldWarII(NewYork:ComstockPub.Associates,1964),pp.198-99.
[3].See,forexample,F.H.King,FarmersofFortyCenturies(Emmaus:OrganicGardeningPress,1900).Asanobserverin1900,King,likeJ.L.Buckafterhim,tookpainstounderstandfarmingtechniquesinAsia,thoughhemainlyemphasizedtheintensivefarminginhisphotograph-illustratedwork.Orientalwriters,however,arefarlessimpressedwiththeirfarmingmethods.See,forexample,Shen,AgriculturalDevelopmentonTaiwan;idem,AgriculturalResourcesofChina(NewYork:CornellUniversityPress,1951);andNien-tsingLu,AnAnalysisofFarmFamilyEconomyofOwner-OperatorsundertheLand-to-the-TillerPrograminTaiwan(Taipei:TheResearchDepartmentoftheBankofTaiwan,1965).Seealsochapter8ofthisstudy.
[4].J.L.Buck,LandUtilizationinChina(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1937),p.242.
[5].EstimatesoflaborintensityrequiredfordifferentcropsareavailableinLu,AnalysisofFarmFamilyEconomy,pp.142-44;andinS.C.HsiehandT.H.Lee,"TheEffectsofPopulationPressureandSeasonalLaborSurplusonthePatternandIntensityofAgricultureinTaiwan,"mimeographed(1964).ThemarketvaluesforvegetablesandothercropsareavailableinShen,AgriculturalResourcesofChina,chap.24;andDepartmentofAgricultureandForestry,TaiwanAgriculturalYearbook.
[6].Seechapter8,table3;andShen,AgriculturalResourcesofChina,chap.24.Seealsotheforty-eightobservedsystemsofcroprotationlistedinLu,AnalysisofFarmFamilyEconomy,pp.124-34.
[7].See,forexample,H.ScottGordon,"TheEconomicTheoryofaCommon-PropertyResource:TheFishery,"JournalofPoliticalEconomy(August,1954).SeealsoAnthonyBottomley,"TheEffectofCommonOwnershipofLanduponResourceAllocationinTripolitania,"LandEconomics(February,1963).
APPENDIXB
RentalPaymentsofFixedandShareContractsinChina
InthisappendixIseektoshowtwothings:thatrentalpercentagesvarywithlandgrades;andthatsharerentsaregenerallyslightlyhigherthanfixed(crop)rents.Thedata,obtainedfromChinesesourcespublishedinthe1930s,leaveagreatdealtobedesired.Ihavebeenunabletodetermineindetailthemethodsbywhichthedatawerepiled,oreventheexactnumbersofsamples.Butmyconfidenceintheirreliabilityisenhancedbythefactthatobservationsindifferentsourcesconsistentlyexhibitthesamepatterns(seechap.3).
1.Intable9,rentalpercentagesofsevendifferentlandgradesintwenty-twoprovinces(China,1932)areshown.Theyrepresentpercentagesofthemaincrops,obtainedexclusivelyfromsharecontracts.Withafewexceptions,lower-gradelandsareassociatedwithlowerrentalpercentages.Accordingtoanothersurveywithsimilardetails(twenty-threeprovincesandsixgradesofland,China,1930),onlytwoexceptionsarefoundinatotalof124observations.[1]
Thelackoffullerinformationstandsinthewayofinterpretingtheseexceptions.Forexample,therentalpercentagedependsnotonlyonthefertilityofland,butalsoontheamountofothernonlandinputsprovidedbyeachofthecontractingparties.Furthermore,somelandsmightgrowmore"minor"cropsthan.
others,andtheirsharingdoesnotseemtohavebeenappropriatelyincluded.
2.Intable10,Iintendtoshowthatsharerentsaregenerallyhigherthancroprentsbecauseoftherisksharing.Thefiguresareexpressedasfixedmonetaryvalues.Notonlydowefindafewexceptions,butsomeofthedifferencesappearundulylarge.Accordingtoanothersurveyofsimilarparison(China,1932),[2]inwhichfixedandsharerentsareexpressedinpercentagesoftheoutputyields,wefindafewexceptionsalso(fixedrentsbeinghigherthansharerents),butthedifferencesaregenerallysmall.