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第38章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (32)

第38章 《佃農理論》英語原著 (32)

Athirdcharcteristicofsharecontractsisthattherentalpercentagemayvaryamongdifferentcropsinonecontract(seesamplee).Asisimpliedbythetheoryofsharetenancy,therentalpercentageisdependentuponthecostoftenantinputsandtherelativefertilityofland.Sincedifferentcropsusuallyrequiredifferentratiosoftenantinputstoland,thesharingpercentagesfordifferentcropsshouldbeexpectedtodifferwithinasinglecontract.Butanysetofdifferentrentalpercentagesfordifferentcropscanalsobeexpressedintermsofasingle(weightedtimeaverage)rentalpercentage,uniformforallcrops,toyieldthesamepresentvalueoftherentalreturn.Itappearsthatthelatteroptionofauniformrentalpercentage(seecontractsampled)wouldbemoreconvenient.However,ifatenantissubjecttodismissalatanytimeintheeventofpoorperformance,theuseofoneuniformrentalpercentageforcropsharvestedatdifferentseasonswouldbelikelytoleadtodisputesorrenegotiationshouldtenancydismissalbeineffect.Weusuallyfindauniformrentalpercentagebeingusedinashareleasewithspecifiedduration,andthat,whenmultiplepercentagesarefoundinaleasewithindefiniteduration,auniformpercentageisusuallyusedfordifferentcropsharvestedinthesameseason(seecontractsamplee).

Wemaysummarizethecharacteristicsofsharecontractsbyquotingtheobservationmadebytwowriters-whowerecriticaloftenantfarminginChina:

Underthesystemofsharerent,theyieldsaftereachharvestaretobesharedaccordingtocertainmutuallystipulatedpercentagesbetweenthelandownerandthetenant.Withtheexceptionofsomelandusedforfarmsteadpurposes,thetenantisrequiredtocultivatealmostalltheassignedfieldsfortheproductionofcrops.Sometimes,thetenantisevenrequiredtofurnishfarmingequipment……andotherexpenses.Thelandownerandthetenantmutuallydecidetheareatobeusedforeachcrop……Besidestheabove,theonlyaffairofmanagementoverwhichthelandownerexercisescontrolisconfinedtopermanentimprovementsoflandassets.Thislastcharacteristicisidenticalwithfixed-rentcontracts.[16]

[1].SeeJ.L.Buck,FarmOwnershipandTenancyinChina(Shanghai:NationalChristianCouncil,1927).

[2].NationalGovernment,StatisticsDepartment,StatisticalAnalysisofTenancySystemsinChina(China:ChengChungBookStore,1942),pp.52-53.

[3].Pe-YuChangandYin-YuenWang,QuestionsofFarmTenancyinChina(Chungking:CommercialPress,1943),p.68.

[4].NationalGovernment,StatisticalAnalysis,pp.54-55.

[5].Seeibid.,pp.53-54;andChangandWang,QuestionsofFarmTenancy,pp.67-70.

[6].DepartmentofRealEstates,ChinaEconomicYearbook(China,1936),pp.G62-83.

[7].ExecutiveYuan,ChangesinLandRights(China,1942),no.2.Thedatawereobtainedfromsamplecontractsinfourteenprovincesin1938.

[8].Unfortunately,Ihavenotbeenabletofinddatathatwouldconfirmorrefutethisstatement.

[9].Notethatwithasharecontractthelandownernotonlysharesthepossiblelossinabadyear,butalsothegainofagoodharvestwhichwillreducetheriskpremiumbyafraction.

[10].SeetheUniversityofNanking,RentalSystemsinFourProvinces(Nanking,1936),pp.65-67.

[11].NationalGovernment,StatisticalAnalysis,pp.54-55.

[12].ChangandWang,QuestionsofFarmTenancy,p.63.

[13].Ibid.,pp.63-64.

[14].Samplesharecontractshadnotbeenavailabletomewhenchapter2waswritten.WhenIpredictedthat,accordingtoeconomictheory,tenantinputsarestipulatedinasharecontract,Ididnotmentionthestipulationofmultiplecropplantationsbecauseonlyonemutuallyagreedproductwasassumed.

[15].J.L.Buck,ChineseFarmEconomy(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1930),pp.149-50.

[16].ChangandWang,QuestionsofFarmTenancy,p.49.ForsimilarobservationsseeChing-MohChen,LandRentsofVariousProvincesinChina(Shanghai:CommercialPress,1936);Chi-MingChiao,ASocialandEconomicStudyofFarmVillagesinChina(Nanking:UniversityofNanking,1938),chap.9;andChinaEconomicResearchDepartment,SourceMaterialsofRecentChineseAgriculturalHistory,1912-27(Peking:UnitedBookStore,1957),pp.89-95.

C.TheDurationofLeaseContracts

AninvestigationconductedinChina(1934),coveringatotalofninety-threeprefecturesineightprovinces,showsthatthedis-tributionofleasedurationswasasfollows:29percentofthetenantcontractswereindefinite(thatis,unspecifiedandusuallyterminableaftereveryharvest),25percentannualleases,27per-centfromthreetotenyears,8percentfromtentotwentyyears,and11percentwereperpetualleases.[1]Twothingsshouldbenoted.First,astipulatedleasedurationmeansonlythattenancymaynotbeterminatedaslongasthecontractedtermsareful-filledbyeachparty.Thatthedurationoftheleaseisspecifieddoesnotprohibitmutualrenegotiationswithintheleaseduration.Second,asthefrequencyofshort-termleaseshasbeenusedtoillustratetheturnoverrateoftenancy,itshouldbepointedoutthatleaseterminationisnotthesameastenancydismissal.Availabledatarevealthatthefrequencyoftenancydismissalwasnothigh.[2]

Intheliteratureonlandtenure,twoargumentshavebeenmonlyusedinsupportoftheallegedinefficiencyofleasedurationsoflessthantenyears.[3]Oneofthemclaimsthatshortdurationsimposeinsecurityonthetenantandthusimpairhisincentivetofarm.Butinsecurity,althoughundesirableforthetenant,mayprovideastimulustofarmingactivity.[4]Anotherargumentisthattheshort-termleasediscouragesinvestmentinland.Butthisisrefutedbythefactthatyieldsperacreontenantfarmsarenotlowerthanonownerfarms;norhasanyevidencebeenofferedtoshowthat,inChina,productivityundertenancyvarieswiththedurationofaleasingcontract.

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